Views of power & critical remarks on ›participation‹ moreA short paper for the workshop: ›Critical Unconference Forum‹ at the |
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Participatory Research, Community Psychology, Participation, Critical Theory, Pierre Bourdieu, Evaluation Research, Power (social), and Steven Lukes
Document version #2, 2012-01-17
David Vossebrecher
Views of power and critical remarks on the concept of ›participation‹
Short paper for the workshop: ›Critical Unconference Forum‹ at the 8th European Conference on Community Psychology, York 2011
Introductory remark
There is a rather imprecise and narrow understanding and use of power mechanisms, structures and impacts, both in the fields of programme evaluation and Community Psychology1. This understanding is much based on the idea that power is about one actor (= EGO) being able to make another actor (= ALTER) act as EGO wishes (this springs from Max Weber’s concept of power), and on focusing on conflict or negotiation. Inherit to ‘Weberian’ views of power is a personalisation and individualisation, where power is element of the relation and interaction between two – ALTER and EGO – and by tendency also is something one of the two ‘owns’ or ‘has’. Power is in this view not (or not essentially) an element of social structures and the status quo of society. The need to go beyond this view is again and again mentioned by scholars, but apparently there are obstacles to making it a central insight, which is guiding the fields’ self-reflection and construction of theory and praxis/ practice. An example for this difficulty can be obtained from the debate on the understanding of power in the context of Community Psychology between David Fryer (2008) and Isaac Prilleltensky (2008).
Three approaches to theorising power
I will draw on some thoughts from a German scholar named Byung-Chul Han, on Steven Lukes’ critique on concepts of power in political and social science, and finally on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of the ‘habitus’ and of symbolic power, which can fill an important shortcoming in (scientific) talk about participation.
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In my PhD thesis research I am inquiring participation in the field of programme evaluation and see the understanding of participation tied strongly to a particular concept of power and its practical application. For this short paper I apply some of that to Community Psychology (CP), which I think shares some shortcomings in understanding power with the programme evaluation field. In the PhD thesis I draw on mostly German literature as well as on Bourdieu; but in the German translation and in the German tradition of discourse on Bourdieu, which I expect will differ from discourses elsewhere in whichever way. 1 von 4
David Vossebrecher | Critical views of power & the concept of participation | 8 ECCP York 2011 (Document version #2, 2012-01-17)
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Byung-Chul Han (2005) argues that at no moment power is stronger and more effective than the moment it is not seen (anymore): “Power not necessarily takes the form of coercion. The fact that an opposing will emerges at all and articulates against the power-holder, testifies the weakness of his power. The stronger the power is, the more silent it operates.” (Han 2005, 9; original emphasis)2 So, power goes way beyond apparent conflict, and as well beyond easy to detect situations of domination and subordination. It is not “linear” in the sense of controlling or determining others’ actions. Power is more a spatial phenomenon: it creates a field (= space), in which ALTER (and EGO, too) place and situate their action, interaction and praxis. In that way the field pre-forms possible action (Han 2005). Byung-Chul Han calls this “mediated power”3, meaning that it is not a direct and obvious force effecting the situation. But nonetheless it is power, conceptualised as being strongly connected to the production of meaning: constructing meaning, processes of sense-making, creation of what is ‘true’, what is possible, and what not.
Steven Lukes (2005) develops a ‘three-dimensional view’ of power by reviewing concepts of power in the US-political science, which he labels one-dimensional and two-dimensional. His critique is that these limit the view of power to (a.) overt and observable, actual behaviour; (b.) decision-making or avoiding decisionmaking, and (c.) to situations of observable conflict (Lukes 2005, 25). They hold a too “individualist” perspective, which follows Max Weber in his notion that power is “the probability of individuals realizing their wills despite the resistance of others” (Lukes 2005, 26; original emphasis). Both the one- and the two-dimensional view lack an adequate understanding of the role of collective forces and social arrangements, which is necessary to explain ‘agenda-setting’: the power to exclude or include political issues (ibid.). The “phenomenon of ‘systemic’ or organizational effects” as well as the “the phenomenon of collective action” are both “beyond individuals’ decisions or behaviour” (ibid.). Adding to the systemic (or: structural) and the organisational effects, Bourdieu would point to the importance of cultural effects. The three-dimensional view points out, that power is also present in agendasetting and controlling agendas, which is not necessarily done through decisions. It takes into sight, that there is – beyond the issues actually discussed – a wide range of other potential issues, which may in fact never be raised. Furthermore, beyond observable conflict, there possibly lies latent conflict. So the question is: is agreement and compliance to issues and decisions (= the status quo) genuine and ‘true’? That means not to rule out the possibility that there is
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Translation by D.V. In German: „Die Macht muss nicht die Form eines Zwanges annehmen. Dass sich überhaupt ein gegenläufiger Wille bildet und dem Machthaber entgegenschlägt, zeugt gerade von der Schwäche seiner Macht. Je mächtiger die Macht ist, desto stiller wirkt sie.“)
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Translation by D.V. In German: “vermittelte Macht”
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David Vossebrecher | Critical views of power & the concept of participation | 8 ECCP York 2011 (Document version #2, 2012-01-17)
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“false or manipulated consensus” (Lukes 2005), when those in power affect the beliefs and interests of people. And, finally and even beyond, those in power – which, of course, are not only persons, but as well institutions/ organisations with their structural and systemic forces – may affect the basic beliefs of people. At this level, Lukes speaks of possible latent social conflict.
Pierre Bourdieu further elaborates on “latent” or implicit and incorporated/ habitualised forms of power with his more radical, inter-connected concepts of ‘social field’, forms of ‘capital’, ‘symbolic power’, and ‘habitus’, of which I will here only focus on the last two. Bourdieu developed a theory of power which is part of his theory of society. As a scholar he has strong origins in structuralist Marxism and structuralist anthropology; however large parts of his work are dedicated to criticising and overcoming the idea of structuralist determinism. To Bourdieu, Power (as well as society in general) is incorporated/embodied and habitualised, but not in the sense of a psychological reduction. There is no individual, and no part of the individual, which is ‘out of’ or ‘before’ society. He is conceptualising this, amongst other concepts, by ‘habitus’. A person’s habitus is a structure, which is the basis for his/her whole repertoire of ways to act and behave in the world, to interpret and understand it. So the habitus contains and consists of thought, action, meaning/ sense-making, language, taste/aesthetic preferences etc. It is fundamentally connected to the individual’s position in society, as the habitus is acquired from birth on. The habitus forms a structure, which, on the one hand, is produced in history of human societies, and any individual shape and characteristic of habitus is “produced” by society, i.e. its affections on individuals as they grow up – but this “production” is not in a deterministic way, as it is not a process of linear imprinting with totally uniform results. Simultaneously, the habitus is productive: it allows generating actions, thought, meaning, and appraisal that fit most situations a person might encounter and that is appropriate to the persons’ position in society and relation towards others and institutions in terms of gender, class, ethnicity, socio-economic status and so on. (Bourdieu 1993, pp. 102) In this way the concept of habitus contributes to explain the stability of society and the status quo of social relations. So besides inequality of resources such as poverty and others, and besides legal or physical coercion, there is the capacity of power via social classification and formation of meaning, which is inscripted in the bodies and is habitualised. Bourdieu calls this the symbolic dimension of power, meaning that the oppressed give a kind of compliance, which not based upon a conscious decision and free will, but on an immediate and pre-reflexive subjugation of the socialised body (Bourdieu 1997).
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Considerations and questions
To me, it is Bourdieu’s conception more than others, that allows for awareness of the embodied history, both personal and societal, that individuals bring into situations of participation, and awareness of how these ‘loads’ – by the habitus – are related to past and present structure of society (and, one might add, to its probable future). Spoken from that insight, it is important to provide contexts which allow for participation, and that is not at all new to Community Psychology. But equally important one has to be ready to take serious and deal with the weight of these ‘loads’ people carry within their bodies. Otherwise the claim for participation is undermined and with no (wanted) effects. How can this be done in desired-to-be participatory fields and contexts in communities, in program evaluation, in action research etc.? How can the term “critical” be best understood from here?
References
Bourdieu, Pierre (1993). Sozialer Sinn. Kritik der theoretischen Vernunft. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. [French edition: Le sense practique (1980); English edition: The Logic of Practice, Stanford University Press, 1990] Bourdieu, Pierre (1997). Die verborgenen Mechanismen der Macht enthüllen. In: Pierre Bourdieu, Die verborgenen Mechanismen der Macht. Schriften zu Politik & Kultur 1, Hamburg: VSA-Verlag, S. 81-86. [The title translates “Uncovering the hidden mechanisms of power“] Fryer, David (2008). Power from the People? Critical Reflection on a Conceptualization of Power. Journal of Community Psychology, 36, 238–245. Han, Byung-Chul (2005). Was ist Macht? Stuttgart: Reclam. [The title translates “What is power?“] Lukes, Steven (2005). Power. A Radical View. (2nd, extended edition). Palgrave Macmilan. [1st edition: 1974] Prilleltensky, Isaac (2008). The role of power in wellness, oppression, and liberation: The promise of psychopolitical validity. Journal of Community Psychology, 36, 116–136.
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